DF-61: Chinese ICBM

• China’s primary goal with this test was to counter US missile defences.
• it undoubtedly erodes US nuclear superiority by enhancing China’s second-strike capability.
• Visible silver-white light trails were captured in the videos of onlookers

The Dongfeng-61, an intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People’s Republic of China, was  publicly unveiled at the 2025 China Victory Day Parade on 3 September 2025 in Beijing. Its design closely resembles the earlier DF-41, leading analysts to speculate it may serve as a successor.

The DF-61 missile could be the launcher for one or more intercontinental-range nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and potentially the system referenced in 2024 congressional testimony by then-Principal Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defence for Space Policy, Dr Vipin Narang, as a ‘strategic hypersonic glide missiles that can carry nuclear warheads’. China has already introduced the conventionally armed DF-17 (CH-SS-22) hypersonic boost glide vehicles into service. A further project, the DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24), has also been associated with an HGV. This missile may have a range toward the upper end of intermediate-range ballistic systems.

According to The Guardian, four DF-61 launchers were paraded, each mounted on 16-wheel road-mobile HTF5980 transporter erector launcher (TEL). Western analysts described the system as the “main surprise” of the parade, with its estimated range of approximately 12 070 km miles, sufficient to reach Washington, D.C., from Beijing.

Defence experts in Taiwan described the DF-61 as an instrument of "political denial", citing its potential to carry nuclear warheads intended to deter foreign intervention, particularly in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. These views were shared alongside commentary on other systems unveiled at the parade, including the JL-3 SLBM and AJX002 underwater drone.

Development and speculation

According to analysis by the Federation of American Scientists, the DF-61 was the only entirely new nuclear missile system presented at the 2025 parade. Its launcher appeared nearly identical to that of the DF-41 displayed in 2019, leading to speculation that it may be either a modified version of the DF-41 or a new missile design derived from it. Some observers suggested it could even have been the rumoured conventional ICBM, although its inclusion in the explicitly nuclear formation made that unlikely.

China’s missile arsenal includes short-range missiles such as the DF-15/16, medium-range missiles like the DF-26—the so-called “Guam Killer”—and ICBMs such as the DF-31 and DF-41, which can strike essentially anywhere in the United States.

In the PLARF’s most recent ICBM test in September, the mystery missile in question apparently spanned over 12 000 km, passing near the Philippines and Guam before a dummy payload splashed down near French Polynesia’s Marquesas Islands. 

All this took place shortly after China’s bombastic 80th anniversary parade in Beijing, commemorating its victory over Japan in World War II. At that parade in Beijing, the DF-61 was publicly unveiled for the first time. The DF-61, displayed on a 16-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), similar to the DF-41s, is described as the successor to that system. 

For several years, the Chinese have embarked upon a massive nuclear weapons modernization and expansion spree. It is believed that China has more than 500 warheads, with plans to have a 1 000-strong nuclear weapons arsenal by 2030. There are also mobile systems in China’s arsenal, like the DF-31AG, enhancing survivability and second-strike capabilities. 

What We Know About the DF-61 So Far

It is believed that the dazzling (and mysterious) September test in China was an extension of prior launches, including a DF-41 test into the Pacific last September and a nighttime test in March of this year.

Visible silver-white light trails were captured in the videos of onlookers that were then posted to Weibo and Douyin which displayed “knot” formations in the smoke pattern, as well as screw-like swirls indicative of booster separation and thrust-vectoring. 

It is believed that the weapon followed a depressed—flattened, low-altitude—flight trajectory with a straight boost phase and shallow terminal dive. The reason that China would design a weapon with a flattened flightpath would be to reduce the flight time and, therefore, the detection and reaction time of defenders in whatever territory China was targeting with this new weapon. 

This sort of flight pattern increases drag and stress on the weapon, but it also complicates interception by systems, like the THAAD and Aegis, which anticipate parabolic arcs. What’s more, this sort of flightpath challenges US space-based missile sensors by compressing response times to mere minutes. 

There was evidence of secondary ignition mid-flight (potentially scramjet-powered), aluminium-based propellant (similar to the Chinese DF-21/26/31 models of missiles), and suggesting the integration of a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). If this did involve an HGV, the idea would be for the missile to boost the HGV to near-space at which point that HGV would be replaced.

Did China and Russia Collaborate on the DF-61?

Unlike traditional re-entry vehicles, HGVs are unpredictable, evading intercepts and bypassing American defence zones in Alaska or California. China’s new weapon, if the reports and rumours are accurate, appears similar to Russia’s Avangard system—which should come as no surprise, considering how close China and Russia have already become.

China’s primary goal with this test was to counter US missile defences, like the Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD), Aegis, and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, all of which could undermine China’s nuclear deterrence. Indeed, boost-glide hypersonic weapons pose a severe challenge to American missile defence systems, which are primarily designed for traditional ballistic threats with high, predictable arcs.

Whatever the specific weapon that was tested was called, it undoubtedly erodes US nuclear superiority by enhancing China’s second-strike capability, forcing investments into new countermeasures such as hypersonic weapons interceptors. It complicates deterrence, as defences optimised for parabolic threats become obsolete—and could spark an arms race as America works to build up similar missiles of its own.